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Abstract
We identify credible monetary policy with ﬁrst, a disconnect between
inﬂation and inﬂation expectations and second, the anchoring of the latter
at the inﬂation target announced by the monetary authorities. We test
empirically whether this is the case for a number of countries that have
an explicit inﬂation target and therefore include the Euro Area. We ﬁnd
that for the last 10 year period, the two series are less dependent on each
other and that announcing inﬂation targets help anchor expectations at
the right level.
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11 Introduction
Mishkin (2007) emphasizes the importance of a nominal anchor for inﬂation ex-
pectations. He argues that an institutional commitment to a nominal inﬂation
target1 helps promote price stability and is a crucial element to successful man-
agement of inﬂation expectations. This is a key feature of the recent theory on
optimal monetary policy, (Clarida, Gali, and Gertler, 1999; Woodford, 2003).
The implication of commitment is that there appears a disconnect between in-
ﬂation and inﬂation expectations. In inﬂation targeting countries, expectations
thus aim to follow the anchor provided by the central bank (Demertzis and Viegi
2008, 2009) and inﬂation is only aﬀected by the variability of shocks that hit it.
Empirically, a number of studies have attempted to examine whether countries
that have an explicit inﬂation target have managed to perform better. Levin
et al (2004) argue that if expectations are better pinned down in an inﬂation
targeting regime, then the relation between expectations (for diﬀerent horizons)
and current inﬂation is weaker. They ﬁnd that indeed for inﬂation targeters the
correlation between inﬂation and inﬂation expectations is a lot smaller, and in-
ﬂation is a lot less persistent. Others have shown that a successful commitment
to a nominal anchor has been found to produce not only more-stable inﬂation
but also lower volatility of output ﬂuctuations (Fatás et al 2007; Mishkin and
Schmidt-Hebbel, 2002, 2007). Using the diﬀerence between far-ahead forward
rates on nominal and inﬂation-indexed bonds as a measure of compensation for
expected inﬂation and inﬂation risk at long horizons, Gürkaynak et al (2010)
ﬁnd evidence that a well-known and credible inﬂation target helps to anchor the
private sector’s perceptions of the distribution of long-run inﬂation outcomes.
We apply the methodology from Demertzis et al, (2008) to identify the degree
to which inﬂation expectations have indeed been anchored and at what level, for
a number of inﬂation targeting countries, but also the Euro area (and Japan).
For the countries for which suﬃcient data is available, we check how this degree
of anchoring, and the target itself, have evolved over a given period. For the rest
we provide an average estimate since 1999. In turn, we check how the implicit
anchor derived from the analysis compares to the inﬂation target announced by
the respective central banks. We ﬁnd that for this period, inﬂation expectations
were disconnected from inﬂation and have successfully stabilized at levels close
or at the target followed by the Central Bank.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a number of stylized
facts about inﬂation and long term inﬂation expectations, for a set of inﬂation
targeting countries as well as Japan. Section 3 deﬁnes the anchoring eﬀect and
measures the way it has evolved for Sweden, Israel and the Euro-zone, for which
there is suﬃcient data. Section 4 then describes the econometric setup, which
allows us to formulate a number of testable hypotheses on the extent of the
anchoring eﬀect. Section 5 presents the results and section 6 summarizes and
concludes.
1Or commitment more generally, see Albanesi et al (2003) and Christiano and Gust, (2000).
22 Stylized facts
We start by describing a series of stylized facts on the relationship between
inﬂation and long term inﬂation expectations for a number of OECD countries.2
We report stylized facts for several countries, many of which follow an explicit
inﬂation targeting framework. Notice that the Euro-Area is not an inﬂation
targeter, but it has an explicit inﬂation objective, which it communicates to the
public.
2.1 Inﬂation and Inﬂation Expectations
It is fair to say that most of the IT countries had experienced periods of relative
high and volatile inﬂation prior to the introduction of explicit targets but have
also seen, on the whole, signiﬁcant improvements in inﬂation around the time
of introducing it (Bernanke et al, 1999). Figures 1-2 plot inﬂation and long-
run inﬂation expectations from 1999 till 2008.3 For the inﬂation targeter (IT)
countries we also report the bands and the way they may have changed since
1990.
A number of countries have introduced the target at the bottom, or at rela-
tive low levels, of the downward trend (e.g. Sweden, UK, Switzerland). Others
waited till inﬂation had stabilized at relatively low levels (Norway, Australia).
Finally, a separate group have changed the inﬂation target bands progressively
to bring inﬂation down (New Zealand, Canada), an approach that proved par-
ticularly popular in countries that were at the time facing relatively high levels
of inﬂation (most Latin American countries, but also Central European coun-
tries but also Israel). For a number of countries we see that expectations are
simply disconnected from the level of inﬂation and are focused on the mid-
point (Canada and Sweden being the prime examples, followed by Australia
and New Zealand). The UK is also very interesting, especially since agents were
very quick to internalize the change of inﬂation measure targeted in December
20034. But the Euro-zone and Norway, who only have an upper limit rather
than a symmetric band around a target, also appear to fall into this category
with that limit eﬀectively acting as a ceiling for expectations.
2We do not include the US in our sample as it is dealth with in Demertzis et al (2008).
3Data on inﬂation targeting bands is based primarily on Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel
(2002), Levin, Natalucci and Piger (2004) and national Central Bank web sites. Series for
inﬂation (quarterly, CPI y-o-y, 1990q1-2008q2) are taken from DATASTREAM. Data for
expectations refer to Consensus Forecasts 10-year ahead inﬂation expectations (semi-annual).
Euro area inﬂation expectations refer to 5-year ahead and for Israel we use capital market
inﬂation expectations 10 years based on breakeven numbers (monthly based on daily data).
4The Bank of England has been targeting the RPIX till December 2003 at a level of 2.5%.
After that it has switched to targeting CPI at the level of 2%. We thus present data for
the ﬁrst till December 2003 and the second after that. The remit given to the MPC by the
Chancellor states that the target is a point target. We report bands however of ±1% to reﬂect
that the Governor must write an open letter to the Chancellor explaining why inﬂation is
away from the point target, what actions the MPC will take to return inﬂation to target and
































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1: Inﬂation and inﬂation expectations
But there are also big diﬀerences in the way countries have implemented the
inﬂation targeting regime.5 For some countries, the target and bands around it
have been seen, right from the start, as the long term objective. Countries like
Australia, Sweden or Norway announced just the one band-width (and target).
For others, there has been a certain degree of reﬁning at the beginning, (see
Canada, New Zealand and to a lesser extent the UK), eventually settling at a
unique target and band-width after few adjustments. On the other hand, for
5Goodfriend (2007) mentions that ITers may diﬀer in four respects: "...1) the announce-
ment of an explicit numerical inﬂation target by the central bank, 2) patience in reversing an
inﬂationary shock to minimize adverse eﬀects on employment, 3) transparency of central bank
concerns and intentions about the economy and interest rate policy, and 4) formal governance
mechanisms designed to hold a central bank accountable for inﬂation outcomes".
4a big number of countries, inﬂation targets and the bands around them were
introduced progressively and were subject to changes in small and gradual steps.
This is typical for countries that were on a disinﬂationary path and were using
the regime very much as a means of building up credibility (see for example








































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2: Inﬂation and inﬂation expectations
Observing the summary statistics in tables 1a-1c, inﬂation and inﬂation expec-
tations have been relatively low for the periods reported. Data typically start
in 1990, or as soon as inﬂation expectations are available.
6Data for inﬂation expectations is monthly as we explain further down, where we also plot
it. We do not plot this in ﬁgure 2. Also as Japan is not an inﬂation targeter, we plot no
relevant bands.
5Table 1a. Inﬂation and long run inﬂation expectations
Australia Canada New Zealand
Infl Infle Infl Infle Infl Infle
Mean 2.42 3.09 2.22 2.24 2.01 1.88
Median 2.37 2.70 2.11 2.00 1.99 1.80
Max 6.02 4.90 6.28 4.00 4.58 2.30
Min -0.25 2.40 0.00 1.40 -0.40 1.60
St.Dev. 1.58 0.77 1.27 0.55 1.24 0.21
Persistence 0.58 0.80 0.51 0.70 0.33 1.05
Corr with Inﬂ - -0.12 0.48 - 0.31
Sample 91s1-04s1 90s1-08s2 95s1-06s2
Table 1b. Inﬂation and long run inﬂation expectations
Sweden UK Norway
Infl Infle Infl Infle Infl Infle
Mean 1.34 2.10 3.32 2.79 2.09 2.28
Median 1.28 2.00 2.94 2.45 2.14 2.30
Max 4.18 3.40 9.80 4.50 3.78 2.50
Min -1.19 1.80 0.69 1.80 0.36 2.00
St.Dev. 1.15 0.32 1.83 0.78 0.96 0.17
Persistence 0.66 0.35 0.63 0.76 0.21 0.65
Corr with Inﬂ - 0.10 - 0.42 - -0.38
Sample 95s1-08s2 90s1-08s2 98s2-08s2
Table 1c. Inﬂation and long run inﬂation expectations
Switzerland Euro-Area Japan Israel
Infl Infle Infl Infle
5 Infl Infle Infl Infle
Mean 1.06 1.53 2.22 1.89 0.55 1.43 2.05 2.84
Median 0.89 1.50 2.13 1.90 0.20 1.40 1.81 2.64
Max 2.91 2.00 3.94 2.00 3.80 2.80 6.94 5.81
Min -0.10 1.30 0.88 1.80 -1.17 0.10 -2.74 1.57
St.Dev. 0.70 0.16 0.62 0.06 1.24 0.64 2.52 0.82
Persistence 0.02 0.29 -0.35 0.66 0.80 0.77
Corr with Inﬂ - -0.21 - 0.00 - 0.69 0.32
Sample 98s2-08s2 99s1-08s2 90s1-08s1 01m5-09m2
In addition for most inﬂation targeters inﬂation expectations have correlations
below 0.50 with inﬂation, and only for Canada and the UK are they statistically
6diﬀerent that zero7. The Euro-area8 also has expectations that are always below
the 2 per cent mark and exhibit no correlation with inﬂation. For Japan, a non
inﬂation targeter country without an announced objective, expectations are
highly correlated with inﬂation, have equal persistence as actual inﬂation and,
more importantly, are on average higher than actual inﬂation. In Israel, inﬂation
expectations are on average higher than inﬂation but they are not signiﬁcantly
correlated with inﬂation.
3 The Anchoring Eﬀect
We measure the anchoring eﬀect based on Demertzis et al (2008), who model
inﬂation and inﬂation expectations in a general VAR framework.
πt = a0 + a(L)πt + b(L)πe
t + e1t, (1)
πe
t = c0 + c(L)πt + d(L)πt +e2t. (2)
The intuition behind this framework is that the two variables are intrinsically
related, such that when the level of credibility is low, inﬂation will not reach
its target because expectations will drive it away, and expectations themselves
will not be anchored at the level the Central Bank wishes. The anchoring eﬀect
itself is based on Bomﬁn and Rudebusch (2000), who model this feature by
assuming that long-run inﬂation expectations at time t are a weighted average





∗ + (1 −λ)πt−1. (3)
Parameter λ then measures the degree to which expectations are anchored. If
λ = 1, inﬂation expectations are perfectly anchored to the constant π∗. For
inﬂation targeting regimes, it is possible to cross-check π∗ against the inﬂation
objective πT communicated by Central Banks. Credible regimes will be those
for which both λ = 1 and the anchor matches the objective of the central bank.
Note that the notion of credibility applies to longer horizons, which are no longer
7We examine the signiﬁcance of the correlation coeﬃcients between the variables in question






This statistic is approximately normally distributed, with mean zero and standard deviation
σ = (n − 3)− 1
2 , where n is the sample size. The hypothesis tested is H0 : ρ = 0 against the
alternative H1 : ρ  = 0. Bold indicates signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 5% level.
8From 1999-mid 2003 - EU two-year ahead inﬂation forecasts, 05/2003: Change in the
inﬂation target from below 2% to an inﬂation rate of below, but close to, 2% over the medium
term (www.ecb.int).
9A heuristic expectations formation (Brazier et al 2008), or monetary policy as an infor-
mation game (Demertzis and Viegi, 2008), or expectations learning (e.g. Orphanides and
Williams, 2005), all constitute examples of such an expectations process.
7aﬀected by policy. That is why expectations considered in this context refer to
the long-run (in our case the 5- or 10-year horizon). This deﬁnition does not
necessarily preclude anchored expectations in the short-term, but the movement
of expectations in the short-run is not necessarily evidence of lack of credibility.









Matching coeﬃcients between (4) and (3), we have that:








Therefore, we have an empirical measure of the degree of the anchoring eﬀect.
For those countries that have an explicit inﬂation target we can also check
how close π∗ is to πT, the actual CB target, and thus identify a proxy for its
credibility. Parameter, λ in (5) is not constrained to belong to the [0,1] interval.
If c(L) takes a negative value, or in other words there is a negative relation
between inﬂation and expectations, it is possible for λ to take values greater
than one (from 5). This is never however, economically signiﬁcant. Finally,
estimating λ and π∗ from (5) and (6) implies that the underlying equilibrium
values for the two parameters are constant (see Argov et al, 2007). Alternatively,
we can estimate a time varying VAR, (based on Stock and Watson 1996), which
would then allow us to derive λt and π∗
t and show how they change over the
whole period.10 We apply a Kalman ﬁlter and we do this for Sweden, Israel and
the Euro-zone, for which there is suﬃcient data available.11 For the remainder of
countries, for which data is insuﬃcient to perform a Kalman ﬁlter, we examine
the stability of the relationship before estimating an average measure for λ and
π∗ across the whole period. We discuss this in sections 4 and 5.
3.1 Time-varying λ : Sweden, Israel and Euro area
To calculate a time-varying λ, we need to use data at a higher frequency. We use
5-year ahead inﬂation survey expectations for Sweden in quarterly frequency12
10Parameters in (1) and (2) are assumed to evolve as independent random walks.
11Finally, it is worth mentioning that our measure of credibility is precisely the one employed
by King (1995), who analyzes the diﬀerence between long-run inﬂation expectations (derived
from nominal and real yield curves) and inﬂation targets. It is also close to the expectational
deﬁnitions in Johnson (1997a, 1997b) and Croushore and Koot (1994), which employ short-run
inﬂation expectations from surveys.
12“TNS Prospera has been commissioned by Sveriges Riksbank to undertake a series of
surveys, four times a year, aiming at mapping expectations of inﬂation, wage increase, GDP
and future repo rates in Sweden among labour market parties, purchasing managers and
money market players.” http://www.prospera.se/. They are the weighted means of all groups
interviewed.
8(similarly for the euro area, based on Survey of Professional Forecasters data)
and 10-year ahead Capital market expected inﬂation for Israel.13 Based on the
estimated parameters from the time-varying VAR (1 and 2), we calculate the
time varying λt (from 5). For both series, the Kalman ﬁlter is calculate based



































Inflation Expectations (5-year) pi-star Lambda-Right Hand Scale
Figure 3: Time-varying λ.
Figure 1 shows that the introduction of inﬂation targeting in Sweden in1995
occurred after inﬂation had come down from a level of over 10 per cent. The
bands introduced in Sweden require that inﬂation remains between 1 and 3 per
cent. At the point of the introduction, the degree of anchoring of expectations,
λ, was above 0.6. Inﬂation remained below 2 per cent up till the early 2000, and
despite the fact that it was sometimes below the lower bound, λ kept increasing.
However, a similar violation of the lower band between 2004 and 2006 was met
with a reduction in λ (albeit slow and small), which was sustained in the period
after that, with a violation of the upper bound in 2008 and again a reversal in the
latest period. The latest value estimated is around the level of 0.83. Although
expectations have been above 2 per cent for most of the period in ﬁgure 3, the
implicit anchor π∗ is approaching the level of two per cent, consistent with the
mid-point of the bands.
Expectations data for Israel is monthly and spans from 2001m5 till 2009m2.
As ﬁgure 2 illustrates, inﬂation targeting was introduced in 1992 and unlike
Sweden was used very much as a way of entering a disinﬂationary path. Both
the point target as well as the bands around the point target have changed
13This market series is available on a daily basis but as the highest frequency for inﬂation
available is monthly, we use the last date of the month as the monthly equivalent. We thank





































Inflation Inflation Expectations (10-year) pi-star Lambda (Right-Hand Scale)
Figure 4: Time-varying λ.
substantially and have only stabilized in 2003. Figure 4 then illustrates the
estimates for the time varying λ from 2001. We observe that at the end of 2002
λ is starting to increase and stabilizes at the value of about one in 2003. Similar
to Sweden, inﬂation in Israel has been repeatedly outside the bands set since
2001. The level of λ appears to have been aﬀected for periods when inﬂation
was outside the upper bound (e.g. 2008) but not when the it was outside the
lower bound (e.g. 2003-2004).
As already explained mentioned, the results for the Euro area are based on the
5-year ahead inﬂation expectations of the Survey of Professional Forecasters.
We observe that expectations have been anchored at a level of 2 percent initially
and then below 2 in the latter half of the period (in line with the change in the
way the inﬂation objective was communicated). As Figure 5 shows, expectations
appear to have stabilized at that level, and their anchoring degree ranges from
about 1 to 0.97 at the end of the sample.
4 Testing for the anchoring eﬀect
Based on data for the US, Demertzis et al (2008) argue that a credible monetary
policy regime will be associated with a disconnect between inﬂation and inﬂation
expectations dynamics. In what follows we summarize how this disconnect








































Inflation Expectations (5-years) pi-star Lambda- Right Hand Scale
Figure 5: Time-varying λ.
4.1 A Conjecture
As shown above we model πt and πe









































Conjecture 1 A credible inﬂation expectations disconnect would imply that the
following hypotheses are satisﬁed:
H1: Expected inﬂation is not aﬀected by lagged actual inﬂation, i.e., c(L) = 0.
H2: Actual inﬂation is not aﬀected by expected inﬂation, i.e., b(L) = 0.
H3: The persistence of actual inﬂation should decrease, i.e., the sum of the
coeﬃcients of a(L) should decrease with higher credibility.
H4: There should be no contemporaneous transmission of shocks from actual
to expected inﬂation and vice versa, i.e., σ12 = 0.
Hypotheses H1-H2 can be tested with standard Wald tests. In particular, H1
and H2 correspond to Granger non causality of, respectively, actual inﬂation for
expected inﬂation, and expected inﬂation for actual inﬂation. If there is evidence
of some heteroskedasticity in the errors, a robust (HAC based) version of the
Wald test is used. Hypothesis 4 and the second part of hypothesis 2, refer to
the persistence of inﬂation and inﬂation expectations. The rationale behind this
test is that the greater the credibility, the lower the persistence. Although not
11a formal test, we check the level of persistence for the whole data set (reported
in tables 1a-1c) to the level of persistence for the shorter period since 1999
(reported below in tables 2a-2c). Hypothesis 5 can be veriﬁed by checking the
non-signiﬁcance of the correlation between the VAR errors (core1t,e2t = 0), for
example by applying a Fisher transform test (as in footnote 6).
5 Credible Monetary Policy?
We examine the period from 1999 till the recent past. This is an inﬂation
targeting period for most countries14 and matches also the introduction of the
Euro. This is a period characterized by low and stable inﬂation across most
of the world. We check whether this is also followed by a disconnect between
inﬂation and inﬂation expectations. Tables 2a-c show how inﬂation and inﬂation
expectations have evolved in this period.
Table 2a. Inﬂation and long run inﬂation expectations
Australia Canada New Zealand
Infl Infle Infl Infle Infl Infle
Mean 3.13 2.48 2.28 2.00 2.33 2.09
Median 2.84 2.50 2.28 2.00 2.67 2.20
Max 6.02 2.60 3.80 2.10 3.98 2.50
Min 1.07 2.40 0.72 1.80 -0.40 1.70
St.Dev. 1.51 0.06 0.78 0.06 1.16 0.28
Persistence 0.45 0.46 -0.30 0.18 0.40 0.94
Corr with Inﬂ - -0.43 -0.16 - 0.46
Sample 99s1-04s1 99s1-08s2 99s1-06s2
Comparing tables 1a-c to 2a-c, we see that the average of inﬂation expectations
has diminished. Inﬂation itself has remained in more or less the same levels
as for the whole period but its persistence has signiﬁcantly reduced (H3). At
the same inﬂation expectations have reduced on average and the correlation
with inﬂation has mostly reduced (except for New Zealand). Similarly, inﬂation
expectations persistence is also lower for the latter period.
Table 2b. Inﬂation and long run inﬂation expectations
Sweden UK Norway
Infl Infle Infl Infle Infl Infle
Mean 1.57 1.97 2.86 2.18 2.08 2.28
Median 1.39 2.00 2.94 2.20 2.11 2.30
Max 4.18 2.00 4.58 2.60 3.78 2.50
Min 0.28 1.90 0.69 1.80 0.36 2.00
St.Dev. 1.04 0.05 1.10 0.23 0.98 0.18
Persistence 0.33 0.09 0.44 0.64 0.21 0.65
Corr with Inﬂ - -0.21 - -0.42 - -0.38
Sample 99s1-08s2 99s1-08s2 99s1-08s2
14Note that Switzerland only adopted inﬂation targeting in 2000.
12Table 2c. Inﬂation and long run inﬂation expectations
Switzerland Euro-Area (q) Japan
Infl Infle Infl Infle
5 Infl Infle
Mean 1.12 1.52 2.19 1.89 -0.19 1.03
Median 0.95 1.50 2.18 1.90 -0.40 1.20
Max 2.91 2.00 3.94 2.00 2.00 1.60
Min 0.33 1.30 0.88 1.80 -1.17 0.10
St.Dev. 0.66 0.16 0.63 0.05 0.72 0.44
Persistence -0.10 0.29 0.11 0.77 0.59 0.39
Corr with Inﬂ - -0.13 - 0.08 - 0.50
Sample 99s1-08s2 99q1-09q1 99s1-08s1
The descriptive statistics for Japan point to a movement in the right direction
but there is still a signiﬁcant contemporaneous correlation between inﬂation and
expectations. Table 3 summarizes the test results for hypotheses H1,H2 and H4.
We see that there is no causality between the two variables in inﬂation targeting
countries, with the exception of Australia, for which inﬂation still appears to
aﬀect the way expectations are formed. This is also the case for Israel.
Table 3. H1, H2, H4, (1999s1-2008s2)
Dependent Excluded df χ2 (Pr) core1,e2
UK π πe 1 0.45 (0.50) -0.01
πe π 1 0.05 (0.83)
SW π πe 1 3.71 (0.05) -0.01
πe π 1 3.48 (0.06)
NZ π πe 1 0.00 (0.97) 0.04
πe π 1 0.45 (0.50)
CA π πe 1 0.38 (0.53) -0.01
πe π 1 3.56 (0.06)
AU π πe 1 1.95 (0.16) 0.00
πe π 1 12.24 (0.00)
NO π πe 1 2.27 (0.13) -0.01
πe π 1 0.03 (0.86)
Euro-Area π πe 1 0.64 (0.42) 0.00
πe π 1 1.65 (0.20)
CH π πe 1 1.89 (0.17) -0.02
πe π 1 0.26 (0.61)
JP π πe 1 0.14 (0.70) 0.10
πe π 1 0.08 (0.78)
Israel π πe 6 16.5 (0.01) 0.27
πe π 6 2.51 (0.86)
Notes: Bold indicates signiﬁcance at 5% level. Israel (monthly data),
Euro-area, 5-year ahead, df (6) for Israel due to the higher data frequency,
see appendix A for higher order VAR (p).
We also see that shocks do not contemporaneously transmit from one variable to
the other, with the exception of Japan and Israel where this correlation (core1,e2)
13is signiﬁcant.15 Tables 5 and 6 in appendix B report the same results for an
extended period and demonstrates that there has indeed been an improvement in
the latter period, in the sense of a greater disconnect between the two variables.
5.1 Credibility and the anchoring eﬀect
The evidence presented above points to an increasingly weaker relation between
inﬂation and long-term expectations for most of the countries in the sample. To
the extent that the period from 1999 is characterized by such a disconnect, we
can then estimate an average value for the anchoring eﬀect, λ, and the anchor,
π∗. We compare then the implicit anchor to the target or mid-value of the range
announced by the respective central bank. A credible regime thus requires both
a high λ, as well as an anchor that matches the inﬂation target announced.
Table 4 shows the results for the countries in our sample, for the periods indi-
cated in tables 2a-c.16
Table 4. Anchors and Credibility
Country λ π∗ πT
UK 0.99 2.17 2.5
AU 1.0 2.5 2.5
NZ 0.87 2.23 2
NO 0.98 2.31 2.5
SW 0.98 1.98 2
CA 0.96 1.99 2
JP 0.64 1.9 N/A
CH 1.0 1.51 2
Euro Area 0.93 1.88 <2
Israel 1.0 2.85 2
The ﬁndings for the other countries indicate that for the respective periods
examined, monetary policy has been well anchored (i.e., high λ). Among the
countries examined, Japan is the only one where expectations appear to follow
lagged actual inﬂation. For Australia, Sweden and Canada, we observe both a
high level for the anchoring eﬀect after the adoption of inﬂation targeting, as
well as anchoring at the explicit numerical target announced by the bank. This
is also true for the Euro area: the target is not so tightly speciﬁed (‘below but
close to 2 per cent’) but we see that expectations are tied at about 1.88 per cent.
Norway, the UK and Switzerland also beneﬁt from high degrees of the anchoring
eﬀect, but then at a level lower than the announced target. It is worth noting
that the Bank of England changed its inﬂation target from 2 to 2.5 per cent in
December 2003 (see footnote 3). Israel observes also a high value for the degree
of anchoring λ but at a level of inﬂation which is closer to the upper bound (of
3) rather than the mid-point of 2 per cent (consistent also with ﬁgure 4).
15Errors estimated are heteroscedasticity consistent.
16For completeness we also include the same calculations done for the whole periods available
(Table 7 in appendix B).
146 Conclusions
Critical to the decision on how to form expectations is the extent to which
monetary policy is perceived to be credible. For inﬂation targeting countries this
is straight-forward to check as inﬂation outcomes can be cross-checked against
the inﬂation objectives announced. Well anchored expectations at the pre-
announced level then make a strong case for credible and sustainable monetary
policy in the long-run. Our analysis allows us also to check the extent to which
inﬂation expectations are anchored to a certain level and identify what that
level is. We ﬁnd that monetary policy has, on the whole, been credible during
that last ten-year period, and that the adoption of an inﬂation targeting regime
has made an important diﬀerence for most of the countries. Japan remains the
only country in our sample, where expectations are not well anchored. Equally
important in implementing this approach is the realization that credibility and
the underlying anchor are not constant but are subject to changes as new data
becomes available, an important reminder that credibility can be gained but it
can also be lost.
15APPENDIX
A A measure of credibility from a VAR(p)
The VAR(p) equations are:
πt = a0 + a1πt−1 + ...+ apπt−p + b1π
e




t = c0 + c1πt−1 + ...+ cpπt−p + d1πe
t−1 + ... +dpπe
t−p + e2t.
In the long run it is
π = a0 + a1π +... + apπ + b1πe + ... ++bpπe
πe = c0 + c1π +...+ cpπ + d1πe + ... +dpπe,
and
(1 − a1 − ...ap)π = a0 +(b1 + ...bp)πe
π =
a0
1 − a1 − ... −ap
+
b1 +... +bp
1 − a1 − ... −ap
πe and
(1 −d1 −...dp)πe = c0 +(c1 + ...cp)π
πe =
c0
1 − d1 − ...− dp
+
c1 +... +cp






1 −d1 −... − dp
1 −λ =
c1 + ...+ cp
1 −d1 −... − dp
.
The non-linear restrictions to be imposed on the VAR coeﬃcients to ensure that
λ ∈ [0,1] can be derived as for the VAR(1) case. For example, for the VAR(2)
case, it is
πe
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